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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ExcLusIoN OF CONGRESSAIAN-ELECT WHO
MET ALL CONSTITUTIONAL QUALIFICATIONS DEEMfED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
During the 89th Congress, a Special House Subcommittee investigated
the expenditures of the Committee on Education and Labor, of which Adam
Clayton Powell, Jr., was chairman. The Subcommittee found that Powell had
deceived the House regarding travel expenses and that there was strong
evidence showing Powell had directed illegal salary payments to his wife. No
action was taken during the 89th Congress. However, before the 90th Congress
was convened, Democratic members-elect voted to remove Powell from his
position as Chairman of the Education and Labor Committee. When the 90th
Congress convened in January, 1967, Powell was asked to step aside while the
oath was administered to others. The House resolved that the Speaker appoint
a Select Committee to determine Powell's eligibility. Powell was invited 'to
testify before the Committee as to his qualifications, his involvement in con-
tempt proceedings arising from a civil suit in New York, and the alleged
official misconduct. Powell testified only as to his eligibility under the standing
constitutional qualifications: age, citizenship and residency. Throughout the
hearings, he maintained that the standing qualifications are the sole require-
ments for membership and that a member cannot be punished or expelled until
he is seated. The Committee found that Powell met the standing qualifications
but reported that he was in contempt of the courts of New York, had wrong-
fully used House funds and had made false expense reports of foreign trips.
The Committee recommended that Powell be seated but that he be censured,
fined $40,000 and deprived of his seniority. The House debated this proposed
resolution and voted 222 to 202 against bringing it to a vote. An amendment
was proposed calling instead for Powell's exclusion. The Speaker ruled that a
majority vote, as opposed to the two-thirds vote required for expulsion, would
be sufficient to pass the exclusion resolution. The amendment was passed 248
to 176; and the amended resolution was adopted by a vote of 307 to 116, thus
excluding Powell and declaring his seat vacant. Powell and thirteen voters of
the 18th Congressional District of New York brought suit in the District Court
for the District of Columbia naming as defendants five members of the House
and three House employees, directly involved in carrying out the House resolu-
tion; the Clerk, who refused to administer the oath; the Sargeant-at-Arms, who
refused to pay Powell his salary; and the Doorkeeper, who threatened to deny
Powell admission to the Chamber. Powell and his constituents requested three
remedies: an injunction against the House and its employees to prevent them
from carrying out their unconstitutional action; a writ of mandamus ordering
that the House employees perform the services to which Powell was entitled;
and a declaratory judgment that Powell's exclusion was unconstitutional. The
district court dismissed the complaint for want of subject-matter jurisdic-
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tion.1 The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was subject-matter
jurisdiction, but that the "political question" doctrine rendered the case non-
justiciable.2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 3 When the case was heard
by the Supreme Court, the 90th Congress had terminated, and Powell, re-
elected as Congressman, had been seated in the 91st Congress. The Court
affirmed the dismissal against the five Congressmen but reversed as against the
three legislative employees. The Court remanded the questions of salary, fines
and seniority to the District Court. Held, the House is without power to
exclude a duly-elected member who satisfies the standing constitutional require-
ments. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
Powell was a case of first impression. Although both Houses of Congress
have sporadically excluded members-elect who met the standing requirements, 4
no case has been brought to the Supreme Court.6 The only case of legislative
exclusion considered by the Court on its merits" was Bond v. Floyd,7 decided
on first amendment grounds. The question of standing qualifications did not
arise in Bond since the Legislature purported to judge only the sincerity with
which Bond intended to comply with the standing oath requirement. Further-
more, Bond was not complicated by the "political question" doctrine which
has no application when a state action is challenged.8 Bond stands for the
proposition that a state legislator cannot be excluded for exercising a constitu-
tional right. Powell, on the other hand, holds that the House can only exclude
a member-elect if he fails to meet the standing requirements Both cases fall
within a broad area treated extensively by the Court in recent years, protec-
tion of the franchise. 10 Closely related to the right to effectively participate
1. Powell v. McCormack, 266 F.Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1967) (however, the court's reason-
ing more strongly suggests a lack of justiciability based on the political question doctrine).
2. Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
3. Powell v. McCormack, 393 U.S. 949 (1968).
4. Comment, Exclusion of a Member-Elect by a House of Congress, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv.
716, 721-23 (1967); Comment, Legislative Exclusion: Jdlian Bond and Adam Clayton,
Powell, 35 U. Car. L. REv. 151, 156-58 (1967).
5. 35 U. Cnr. L. Rav., supra note 4, at 152. Most state courts that have considered
the problem of legislative exclusion have concluded that their state constitutions give broad
exclusionary powers to the legislature; a few, however, have restricted the legislature to con-
sideration of the standing requirements. A comprehensive list of state cases can be found,
id. 159-60, n.61.
6. The Court dismissed Alejandrino v. Quezon, 271 U.S. 528 (1925), involving a
legislative expulsion, as moot.
7. 385 U.S. 116 (1966). Bond had been excluded from the Georgia Legislature for
statements against American military involvement in Vietnam. The Supreme Court held
that the action of the legislature constituted interference with Bond's freedom of speech.
Although Powell's support of the Black Power movement may have given the House
additional impetus to exclude him, this aspect did not figure significantly in the case and
was not even mentioned in the Court's opinion.
8. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
9. There may be more than three: article I, § 6 states that a federal office holder is
ineligible to be a member of either House; the fourteenth amendment prohibits seating a
member-elect who has violated any previous oath to support the United States; and article
VI, § 3 requires the taking of an oath to support the Constitution. Bond's exclusion was
based on a Georgia analogue to the oath requirement.
10. Baker v. Carr marked an end to the Court's former policy of abstention on voting
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in elections'1 is the right, claimed by Powell's constituents, to be represented
by one's duly elected representative.
In Bond, the Court commented directly on the constitutional provision
at issue in Powell:
Madison and Hamilton anticipated the oppressive effect on freedom
of expression which would result if the legislature could utilize its
power of judging qualifications to pass judgment on a legislator's
political views. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Madison
opposed a proposal to give to Congress power to establish qualifica-
tions in general. .... Hamilton agreed with Madison that: 'The
qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen . . . are
defined and fixed in the Constitution; and are unalterable by the
Legislature ..... 12
While Powell presented an original issue of American federal constitu-
tional interpretation, there is a significant English precedent. John Wilkes, a
member of Parliament, was expelled in 1764 for seditious libel' 3 and later
sentenced to prison by the courts. After his release, Wilkes was thrice elected
to Parliament and each time declared ineligible.14 Arguing that Parliament
could only judge those qualifications fixed by law, Wilkes was finally seated
in 1782 when the House of Commons voided its prior exclusions, declaring
them "subversive of the Rights of the Whole Body of Electors of this King-
dom."' When the American Constitution was written, English law was thus
fixed by the House of Commons' repudiation of any claim to judge other than
standing qualifications. 16 Wilkes, a strong libertarian, was very popular in
the colonies, and the memory of his case was still vivid during the Convention
Debates five years later in 1787.17 Although a legislative interpretation of
English law made prior to the adoption of the Constitution cannot, of course,
serve as binding precedent in an issue of constitutional interpretation, it
strongly illuminates the words of the Framers.' 8
The pivotal issue in Powell is justiciability; the Court of Appeals found
malapportionment cases by holding that a justiciable issue was presented and remanding the
case for consideration. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963), initiated the 'one man,
one vote' doctrine in statewide primaries for United States Senators and state officials;
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), extended the principle to apportionment of seats in
state legislatures.
11. "As long as ours is a representative form of government, and our legislatures are
those instruments of government elected by and directly representative of the people, the
right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock of our political
system." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
12. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 135-36, n.13 (1966) (emphasis added).
13. 15 Parl. Hist. Eng. 1393 (1764), cited in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 527
(1969).
14. 11 L. GIPsoN, THE BRrarms Em'max BFoRE = A.mncAx REvOLUTIOx 207-15
(1956).
15. 22 Parl. ist. Eng. 1411 (1782).
16. English law remains the same today. See MAY'S PA.LIAiENTARY PRACTIcE 105-08
(1964).
17. R. PosTOATE, TIAT DHvI W3LKFs 171-74 (1929).
18. See generally C. WARREN, THE MAXG OF THE CONSTITUTION 420-22, 424 (1928).
107
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
that although it had subject-matter jurisdiction, certain elements of the case
rendered it non-justiciable. Subject-matter jurisdiction arises from the court's
authority to hear a case; 19 justiciability involves the discretion of the court to
exercise or refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. One aspect of justiciability, the
political question doctrine, 20 arises from a conflict between two disparate
doctrines, separation of powers among co-equal branches and judicial inter-
pretation of the Constitution as enunciated in Marbury v. Madison.21 It has
been variously understood as arising solely as a matter of constitutional inter-
pretation,22 i.e., that the Constitution, by committing authority to another
branch of government, precludes judicial review; or as a doctrine judicially
created to avoid unseemly, unsuitable or politically dangerous conflict with a
coordinate branch; or as a judicial doctrine acknowledging the courts' func-
tional inability to deal with certain issues.2 Formulation of a doctrine of
judicial reticence indicates the courts' awareness of the anti-majoritarian
nature of judicial review and reflects respect for the opinion of the people as
it is expressed by their elected representatives. 24 The doctrine was comprehen-
sively defined and delimited in Baker v. Carr.2 Two problem areas were
definitively resolved: the political question doctrine applies only to prospective
conflicts between coordinate branches of the federal government and has no
applicability to state-federal conflicts; 26 the doctrine should be most sparingly
invoked when constitutionally protected individual rights are involved.27 The
Baker v. Cary test proposes six criteria; a finding that any one is "inextri-
cable from the case at bar" requires a finding of non-justiciability. A "tex-
tually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
[branch]" 28 precludes judicial review. In Powell, a finding on this issue for
19. In a federal issue controversy such as Powell, the requirements of subject matter
jurisdiction are: (1) that the case be a "case or controversy" within the meaning of article
III § 1; (2) that it arise under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, article
I1 § 1; and (3) that the federal court be granted jurisdiction by an act of Congress.
20. The two terms are sometimes used interchangeably although justiciability, as
defined in Baker v. Carr at 198 and 217, is a broader concept, involving the necesity of
legal principles, standards and remedies with which to resolve the controversy as well as
the problem of coexistence with coordinate branches of government.
21. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1804).
22. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAnv. L. REV.
1, 2-10 (1959).
23. See Sbarpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 15
YALE L.I. 517 (1966) and Comment, Erpulsion of a Member-Elect by a Holse of Congress,
42 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 716, 726 (1967).
24. Sharpf, supra note 23, at 588; McCleskey, Judicial Review in a Democracy: A
Dissenting Opinion, 3 flouSTox L. Rav. 364-65 (1966).
25. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
26. "[Ilt is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the
Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives
rise to the 'political question." Id. at 210.
27. "The courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' a bona fide controversy as to whether
some action denominated 'political' exceeds constitutional authority. The cases we have re-
viewed [the apportionment cases] show the necessity for discriminating inquiry into the
precise facts and posture of the particular case, and the impossibility of resolution by any
semantic cataloguing." Id. at 217.
28. Id.
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the purpose of evaluating the case's justiciability is simultaneously a resolution
of the conflicting constitutional interpretations which gave rise to the Powell
case. The second criterion requires that the court have "judicially discover-
able and manageable standards for resolving" 29 the controversy.
Powell presents a problem of remedies arising from the possible applica-
tion of the Speech or Debate clause3 ° as a bar to suitable relief. Issuance of
mandamus against legislators or their employees has never been considered
by the Court. Actions for damages have been allowed against legislative em-
ployees but no actions arising from legislative activities have ever been allowed
against federal or state legislators.31 The third basis for evaluation is the
"impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion. "32 This standard encompasses the doctrines
of primary jurisdiction and ripeness which refer primarily to review of ad-
ministrative agency decisions. It is clearly inapplicable to the instant case
since no initial policy decision is necessary nor could a policy decision be made
elsewhere since it is the court's function to adjudicate clearly defined issues
requiring constitutional interpretation. The next test, "the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government,"'33 requires refinement before
it is applied. Whenever a court, in the course of settling a controversy, finds
a legislative action unconstitutional, it is expressing a certain measure of
disrespect for a coordinate branch. However, most such cases, as distinguished
from Powell, do not involve the legislature as a defendant. A constitutional
interpretation in itself cannot be considered to express disrespect; however
the desirability of avoiding direct confrontation with a coordinate branch
may limit the range of available remedies. The two final criteria, "an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made" and
the "potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by var-
ious departments on one question," were intended to cover the field of foreign
29. Id. Strictly speaking, the requirement applies to all controversies and transcends
the narrow bounds of the political question doctrine.
30. U.S. CO NST. art I, § 6. "The Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all Cases,
except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their
Attendance at the Session . . . and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall
not be questioned in any other place!' (Emphasis added.) This clause is interpreted in Kil-
bourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880).
It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit it to words
spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in its application . . . to
resolutions offered ... and to the act of voting.... In short, to things generally
done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business
before it.
31. Id. at 205; Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1966). In both Kilbourn
and Dombrowski, the Court affirmed dismissals as to the legislators but reversed dismissals
as to the legislative employees. Two actions against legislators alone were held to be barred
by the Speech or Debate clause United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), reversing a
criminal conviction, and Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), affirming dismissal of a
suit for damages.
32. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
33. Id.
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relations and are not relevant to this case.3 4 No single criterion conclusively
commands a finding of non-justiciability; the only basis for such a finding
would seem to be the unavailability of a remedy which would be both suitable
for Powell and not unduly disrespectful to the House, a combination of the
second and fourth elements.
The Court reached a consideration of the constitutional issue and con-
cluded that the standing qualifications are exclusive qualifications and the
only grounds upon which a member can be denied his seat. The Court found
the case was not rendered moot by Powell's seating in the 91st Congress; the
salary claim was sufficient to maintain the suit.35 The Court found it unnec-
essary to rule on the immunity of elected representatives under the Speech
or Debate clause since their presence was not essential to maintaining this
suit. The Court affirmed the district court decision insofar as it had dismissed
the suit against House members; however, the Court ruled that a suit could
be maintained against House employees without violating the spirit of the
Speech or Debate clause.36 The respondents contended that the resolution was
in essence an expulsion rather than an exclusion and should hence be evaluated
according to the constitutional provision for expulsion.3 7 Arguing that the
two-thirds vote required for expulsion was in fact obtained for the final res-
olution, the respondents sought to avoid a court interpretation of the exclusion
clause, "Each House shall be the Judge of the . . . Qualifications of its own
Members."' 8 The Court analyzed the history of the Select Committee's orig-
inal resolution for punishment rather than exclusion, the subsequent amend-
ments for exclusion, and the pattern of voting, and concluded that although
it was impossible to determine with certainty, it was unlikely that the two-
thirds vote required for expulsion would have been forthcoming had the
issue been expulsion.39 The Court therefore treated the resolution as an action
34. Id. See 35 U. Cia. L. Pv. supra note 4, at 162 n.83.
35. Although one remaining live issue is generally sufficient to sustain an action, the
only case in point, Alejandrino v. Quezon, 271 U.S. 528 (1926), was dismissed as moot after
Alejandrino, an appointed member of the Philippine Legislature, had been reseated and only
his claim to 'emoluments' remained. The Court distinguished Alejandrino on the grounds that
Alejandrino had failed to amply plead his salary claim and the Declaratory Judgment Act
had not yet been passed, allowing the Court no alternative to coercive relief. A further
distinction, not articulated by the Court, arises from Alejandrino's status as an appointed
rather than an elected member; protection of the franchise was not at issue.
36. The purpose of the protection afforded legislators is not to forestall judicial
review of legislative action but to insure that legislators are not distracted from or
hindered in the performance of their legislative tasks by being called into court to
defend their actions. .. . Freedom of legislative activity and the purposes of the
Speech or Debate Clause are fully protected if legislators are relieved of the burden
of defending themselves.
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505 (1969).
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, clause 2. "Each House may . . . punish its Members for
disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a member."
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, clause 1.
39. The Select Committee's recommendation for seating and punishment was defeated
by a slight margin, 220 to 200. The subsequent amendments to exclude Powell were passed
by less than a two-thirds majority after the Speaker bad ruled that the vote was for
exclusion and only a majority would be necessary to pass the amended resolution. Faced
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governed by the exclusion clause. The respondents then asserted that the case
was non-justiciable because an appropriate remedy could not be fashioned and
because the Constitution allocates to the House all adjudicative power to deter-
mine a member's qualifications. They argued that coercive relief against officers
of the House is precluded by the Speech or Debate clause. The Court declined
to rule on this question since a declaratory judgment, non-coercive relief, had
been requested and could be granted.40 The Court recognized that a considera-
tion of the textual commitment to the House involved a decision on the basic
issue presented by the case, the scope of the House's judging power. The Court
examined the pre-convention precedents as well as the Constitutional Conven-
tion debates to discover the intention of the Framers and found preponderant
evidence to support Powell's restricted interpretation of the House grounds for
exclusion. The Court found further that the broad interpretation of Congres-
sional power urged by the respondents would effectively nullify the expulsion
clause. If a member could be excluded for any reason by a simple majority vote,
the two-thirds vote required for expulsion would be a meaningless requirement.
Chief Justice Warren, spealdng for the Court, expressed a firm conviction re-
garding the Framer's intentions, but said that had the issue been evenly
weighted on both sides, the Court would have favored a narrow interpretation
of the House's exclusionary power, not so much to protect the rights of the Rep-
resentative as to insure the rights of the electorate. Justice Douglas, in his
concurring opinion, more strongly emphasized this aspect of the decision.
At root of all these cases, however, is the basic integrity of the
electoral process. Today we proclaim the principle of 'one man, one
vote'. When that principle is followed and the electors choose a person
with the certainty that the resolution would muster a majority vote and the conviction
that Powell deserved punishment, many representatives who had originally favored the
lesser punishment suggested by the Select Committee cast their votes for the amended
resolution for exclusion. Had a two-thirds vote been required, Congressmen favoring lesser
punishment or harboring doubts as to the constitutionality of such an exclusion, would not
have supported the resolution but instead would have used their voting power to secure a
compromise. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 510-11 (1969).
40. The Court did not set any guidelines for further proceedings nor did it suggest how
or from whom Powell could recover his salary. Although the Court did not treat the
issue of coercive relief against House employees, it did remand the case to the district court
to enter the declaratory judgment and consider issuance of a writ of mandamus, a coercive
remedy, to compel the release of Powell's back salary. Id. at 551. Since the case was
dismissed below on the grounds of non-justiciability, the issue of coercive relief was not
currently before the Court. Id. at 501-02 n.16. While the Court's practice of remanding those
issues that were not initially treated below may be generally sound, it does not seem appro-
priate to the legal issues of this case. Prerequisite to a finding of justiciability is the existence
of an appropriate remedy. If there is ultimately no judicial remedy by which Powell can
recover his salary, the case will retrospectively have shown itself to be non-justiciable.
However, the declaratory judgment, as inconclusive as it appears, may prove a sound reso-
lution for all parties to this controversy, Powell, the House and the Court. Powell may
need no more than a declaratory judgment either because he only wanted vindication and
has no interest in pressing his salary claim or because the judgment will enable him to
reach an out of court settlement with the House. The Court's issuance of a declaratory judg-
ment avoids a confrontation between the Court and the House while allowing the Court
to make a timely constitutional interpretation.
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who is repulsive to the Establishment in Congress, by what Constitu-
tional authority can that group of electors be disenfranchised?
41
The Court parenthetically touched several issues none of which were essen-
tial to this litigation but which may intimate future decisions just as a careful
reading of the apportionment cases42 and Bond 3 seem, at least in hindsight, to
have pre-ordained the outcome of Powell. In the Powell opinion, the Court's
speculations and asides, taken as a whole, indicate an ever growing concern with
the voters' right of free political expression and a correspondingly narrowing
view of the prerogatives and immunities of the legislature. After dismissing the
complaint against the House members but allowing it against House employees,
the Court carefully left open the issue of legislators' immunity.44 The Court
explained without comment, Powell's argument that the Court should draw a
distinction between declaratory relief sought against members of Congress and
an action for damages or criminal prosecution.45 The Court's gratuitous inclu-
sion of this argument together with its subsequent treatment of legislative im-
munity in terms of social utility rather than traditional privilege suggest that
the Court may allow certain actions against legislators in the future. The Court
identifies two sound reasons for legislative immunity: insurance of freedom of
expression and action for individual legislators40 and prevention of impediments
to the legislative process. 47 Since a legislator incurs no personal liability from a
declaratory judgment, so long as he heeds it in his future conduct,48 and since
a legislator must even now file to dismiss and argue the issue of immunity 4 and
would probably prepare a defense on the merits should he not prevail on the
issue of immunity, it does not seem that the legislator's freedom of action or the
legislative process would be greatly impeded by such an action, particularly if
the legislator were not required to personally appear in court.50 While consider-
ing the question of whether two-thirds of the House members would have cast
41. Id. at 553.
42. See supra note 10.
43. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
44. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 506 n.26 (1969).
Given a disposition of this issue, we need not decide whether under the Speech or
Debate clause petitioners would be entitled to maintain this action solely against
members of Congress where no agents participated in the challenged action and
no other remedy was available.
45. Id. at 500 n.18.
46. "Legislative immunity does not, of course, bar all judicial review of legislative
acts. . . . It insures that legislators are free to represent the interests of their constituents
without fear that they will be later called to task in the courts for that representation."
Id. at 503.
47. "The purpose of the protection afforded legislators is not to forestall judicial review
of legislative action but to insure that legislators are not distracted from or hindered in the
performance of their legislative tasks." Id. at 505.
48. Nor would he be liable for a coercive remedy such as mandamus or injunction
unless he were to disobey the court.
49. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505 n.25 (1969).
50. "Freedom of legislative activity and the purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause
are fully protected if legislators are relieved of the burden of defending themselves." Id. at
505.
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affirmative votes for the resolution had they considered it a resolution to expel
rather than to exclude, the Court examined the House's power under the Ex-
pulsion clause 5 ' to punish a member for misconduct in a prior session. The
Court surveyed House history and documents which convincingly assert that
the House neither has nor should have the power to punish or expel members
for misconduct occurring prior to the current session:
Your committee are of the opinion that the House of Representa-
tives has no authority to take jurisdiction of violations of law or
offenses committed against a previous Congress. This is a purely legis-
lative body, and entirely unsuited for the trial crimes. . . . [T]he
Constitution authorizes 'each House to determine the rules of its pro-
ceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and with the
concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member.' This power is evidently
given to enable each house to exercise its constitutional function of
legislation unobstructed. It cannot vest in Congress jurisdiction to try
a member for an offense committed before his election; for such offense
a member, like any other citizen, is amenable to the courts alone.
2
The Court makes no comment on the correctness of this interpretation but
its inclusion, supported by two persuasive documents,m and the resemblance of
the reasoning in the House document to the reasoning in the Court's discussion
of the Speech and Debate clause is too close to be without implication. The
Expulsion clause, like the Speech or Debate clause, was designed to protect the
legislative process. Since offenses committed before election or in a previous
session are unlikely to interfere with the passage of legislation in a current
session, there seems to be no sound justification for retrospective punishment.
The Court appears to be formulating a narrow concept of the legitimate uses
of legislative immunity and punishment of individual legislators. Since a basic
constitutional right, the right of the electorate to free political expression, is
involved in excluding and expelling legislators, the courts may further impose
the requirement that the legislature bear the burden of showing that there are
no other available means to achieve orderly, uninterrupted legislative progress.54
Powell holds that the House's exclusionary power is restricted to the standing
requirements. If in the future the Court interprets the Expulsion clause55 to
permit punishment and expulsion only for behavior occurring within the current
session, the House's power to take action against one of its members will be
severely limited. If Powell treats the Court's comments as an invitation to secure
51. See supra note 37.
52. H.R. REP. No. 815, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1876); Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 509 n.29 (1969).
53. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 509 (1969).
54. The court in effect, allocated that burden to Congress in Powell. "Unquestion-
ably, Congress has an interest in preserving its institutional integrity, but in most cases
that interest can be sufficiently safeguarded by the exercise of its power to punish its
members for disorderly behavior and in extreme cases, to expel a member with the concur-
rence of two-thirds." Id. at 548.
55. See supra note 37.
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judicial review of his fines and loss of seniority, 6 both of which were based on
misdeeds of a prior session, we may have the answer in the near future. As
Powell's constituents were deprived of their political voice by the House's refusal
to seat him, so they are still deprived of earned political power by Powell's loss
of seniority.
57
Speculation on possible future Court decisions may be futile at this point
since two new justices have been appointed, one of them as Chief Justice. In
this respect Powell offers another vein for speculation. Warren Burger, then
Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, nw Chief Justice
of the United States, wrote a comprehensive opinion in dismissing Powell's
claim at the appellate level. A comparative reading of Chief Justice Warren's
Supreme Court opinion and Burger's appellate opinion58 reveals a divergence
of opinion on the functions and role of the federal courts, which may indicate
the Court's future direction. Both judges found that the claim satisfied federal
jurisdictional requirements: it arose under the Constitution, was a case or con-
troversy and was included within a statutory grant of jurisdiction.
Justiciability was the pivotal issue. Should the Court employ its discretion-
ary powers to exercise or to decline jurisdiction? Applying the same test, Berger
and Warren reached opposite conclusions. Burger elected not to base his opinion
on the "textual commitment to a coordinate branch" aspect of justiciability
but he did comment upon it. Using the text of Baker v. Carr, Burger narrowed
Warren's test by suggesting that so long as a textual commitment to the House
in some measure could be found, the Court should not define the extent of the
commitment.5 9 Although Burger did not rely on a textual commitment to the
House, he found that it would have been an adequate basis for a finding of non-
justiciability had he not discovered more compelling grounds for the same
conclusion."0 The next criterion of the Baker v. Carr"1 test requires "judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" the issue. Burger found
56. Powell's loss of the chairmanship of the Education and Labor Committee is not
open to challenge since the Democratic members voted him out.
57. It is of course possible that the Court will not afford the same legal protection to
earned political power as it has to the right of constituents to have their duly elected repre-
sentative seated.
58. Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
59. This interpretation was arrived at through the use of italics, footnote and innuendo.
In the opinion Burger stated on page 594:
On its face, section 5 commits the power to judge qualifications to the House
in some measure. 38
Footnote 38 read:
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitu-
tion to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds
whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional
interpretation. . . Baker v. Carr, supra at 211, 82 S. Ct. at 706 (emphasis added).
The opinion then continued:
[ilt is clear that a general power of judging has been committed to the House.
If other factors, now to be considered, render the claims inappropriate for considera-
tion, we need not rely on what seems to be a textual commitment.
60. Id.
61. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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this requirement to be inextricably bound with two other criteria, "the impos-
sibility of the court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due co-ordinate branches of government" and "the potential-
ity of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question. ' 62 Burger thought that coercive relief would certainly exhibit
a lack of respect for the House and would create an embarrassing situation for
the government. He rejects declaratory relief as inappropriate because the case
was not an archetypal prospective controversy, and declaratory relief would not
automatically terminate the conflict. Although the posture of the case was dif-
ferent then than it was when the Supreme Court heard it, the 90th Congress not
having yet expired, the same objections obtained to the Supreme Court's grant
of declaratory relief. Powell's claim to his salary requires further steps as his
claim to his seat would have, had Burger granted declaratory relief. Burger,
having found that only coercive relief would be adequate protection for the
rights asserted and that coercive relief would express disrespect for a co-
ordinate branch, concluded that Baker v. Carr rendered the case non-justiciable.
Warren, having settled on declaratory relief, easily dismissed the issue of dis-
respect by pointing out that respect for coordinate branches does not abridge
the Court's historic function of declaring legislative actions unconstitutional.
Implicit in both judges' use of the Baker v. Carr test is a complex of value
judgments.0 3 Warren placed great value on the rights of voters, on free and
effectual political expression, and a correspondingly low value on the privileges
of government insofar as they are not functionally justifiable. The House's
interest in maintaining its dignity and reputation is briefly mentioned at the
very end of the opinion and appears to have had very little bearing on the
Court's decision. 4 Burger saw the citizen's right to political expression through
representative government as limited to the right to choose his representative,
but not extending so far as to see him properly seated in the legislature.65
Burger recognized the direction the Supreme Court might take on appeal but
did not let it control his decision.
... lurking in the language of the Court in Bond can be detected some
hint of a possible relationship between first amendment rights to
62. Id. at 217.
63. Sve A. BICxEL, Tm LEAST DANGERous BRAMCH, 39 (1962).
64. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969). A more ample discussion of
the relative value of official dignity is found in The New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 272-73 (1964):
Injury to official reputation affords no more warrant for repressing speech that
would otherwise be free than does factual error. Where judicial officers are involved,
this Court has held that concern for the dignity and reputation of the courts does
not justify the punishment as criminal contempt of criticism of the judge or his
decision.... Such repression can be justified, if at all, only by a clear and present
danger of the obstruction of justice. . . .If judges are to be treated as 'men of
fortitude, able to thrive in a hearty climate . . . surely the same must be true of
other government officials .... 
65. Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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political expression and the related rights of voters to have their views
articulated for them in Congress.66
Burger chose instead to maximize the government's dignity and the harmony of
the coordinate branches.
S.. if we view the risk of conflicting pronouncements by the House
and the courts . . . the potential for embarrassment is obvious. A
judicial mandate to seat Mr. Powell would in effect be a command to
the Speaker to administer the oath contrary to the terms of House
Resolution 278.67
Judge Burger concluded his opinion by affirming the concept of independent
coordinate branches of government, reflecting that it is all for the best that
some wrongs are without remedy and ultimately assigning a less than equal role
to the Court.
Conflicts between our co-equal federal branches are not merely
unseemly but often destructive of important values.68
That each branch may occasionally make errors for which there
may be no effective remedy is one of the prices we pay for this inde-
pendence, this separateness, of each co-equal branch and for the
desired supremacy of each within its own assigned sphere ....
That courts cannot compel the acts appellants would have us
order in this case recedes into relative insignificance alongside the blow
to representative government were judges either so rash or so sure of
their infallibility as to think they should command an elected co-
equal branch in these circumstances.0 9
What were "these circumstances" as the Warren Court saw them? The
members of the 18th Congressional District of New York were deprived of their
first amendment right to free political expression because the House acted in
violation of the Constitution and refused to seat their duly-elected representa-
tive. The Court's remedy for Powell may have been less than optimal in terms
of certainty of execution. However, coming to terms with the situation seems
preferable to ignoring it entirely. The doctrine of non-justiciability, unlike other
techniques of judicial avoidance, once applied precludes any future court deter-
mination of the issue.70 It cannot be argued that a better case, i.e., one within
the Bond mold, could have been considered at a subsequent date had Powell
been declared non-justiciable, because violation of a basic constitutional right,
the first amendment right of Powell's co-plaintiffs, his electors, was alleged and
accepted by the Court. Although there could have been a more attractive plain-
tiff, there could not have been a better case. The decision of the Supreme Court
in Powell was supported by eight justices. It is difficult to estimate at this time
66. Id. at 598.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 604. The values are not enumerated; unseemliness seems to be the point.
69. Id. at 605.
70. Scharpf, supra note 23, at 538.
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how profound or lasting an influence Warren had on the Court; nor is it now
possible to separate Warren's influence from the independent consensus of the
remainder of the Court. If there is a marked change in the Court's direction, it
will probably be evidenced more by the Court's use of the doctrine of justiciabil-
ity to abstain from decision than by judicial pronouncements on the issues that
come before it.
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